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The second NCF Panel discussion was held at the Holiday Inn on April 5th 2008 with a number of prominent Somalis from the Somali civil society. The topic: The UN-led Peace Initiative: Contributions and the Way Forward was timely and interesting. It came at a time the United Nations (UN) was quietly working on a shuttle diplomacy between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). The day began with introductions and opening remarks on NCF and its objectives (For more information, see the report of the first Panel discussion, March 22, 2008) with emphasis on the need to brain-storm and see if there can be some useful inputs for Ould Abdalla to bring with him during the negotiations. It was also interesting that the UN methodology was new: nobody or very few people knew about what he was doing and this helped actors to talk to the UN more comfortably. After a brief update on political and other developments in Somalia, the participants held group work discussions looking and analysing three main questions and presented their findings. The day was very interactive with a good environment. Women participation was also almost 50% unlike in the past panel.
{jcomments on}Introductions and opening remarks
Since NCF held a similar Panel discussion on ‘Somalia: Options for Reconciliation’ at Jacaranda hotel on March 22, 2008, this Panel was more timely than any of NCF’s past functions. It came at a time the UN was secretly working on a shuttle diplomacy by consulting both camps – the TFG and the ARS – on a possible agenda, venue of meeting and the way forward. NCF made it clear that the Forum, and any of its gatherings, did not represent the views of the different political actors in Somalia but provided an opportunity to discuss further on current developments in Somalia and recommend a way forward and that the main purpose in this case was to see whether there are any inputs that the UN can take it to the two groups.
Political update: An overview of the Initiative
The UN Initiative aimed at the TFG and the ARS: they were invited to Nairobi for a behind the scene dialogue. It was, however, no formal proposal. It is similar to the Khartoum talks in late 2006 but focused more on Somali issues and not on non-Somali issues for example Ethiopia, AMISOM, United States, etc. It also possibly targeted a number of key transitional tasks: power-sharing, security arrangements, constitutional drafting and national referendum, elections in 2009, among other issues. Neither ‘Somaliland’ nor ‘Puntland’ was on the table for the time being. The focus was on south-central Somalia. On the other hand, the picture on the ground is different: the TFG position was that they would engage in dialogue without any pre-conditions; while the ARS would only with certain conditions hence the UN mediation.
Although the actors at the table were the TFG and the ARS, who are the visible actors so far, the briefing was not clear on the role of Al-Shabaab and whether the ARS also represented them in this initiative. It was agreed that there was need for more time in order to allow more wider and internal consultation within the groups: in this case the ARS with their military wing, Al-Shabaab. The briefing pointed out a number of key issues, namely that dialogue was the only way out for Somalia and for the two actors in this political stalemate; that the two groups met with the UN each separately on their own and not face-to-face; and that the current mediation was unclear on the possibility of having a guarantor and on the how-to.
Finally, a number of key questions were raised after the political update before the participants embarked on the group work discussions. A number of points were also put forward including the fact that: Somalia is part and parcel of a Greater Horn of Africa conflict system; that the current UN process was too secret that nobody knew what was going on; and that ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland’ enjoyed more and more political stability and that therefore needed to be preserved and lessons to be drawn from them. The participants also made clear that the ongoing dialogue would be premature without a ceasefire. So far, there was neither official word nor a document about the initiative. There was hope that something would be out by Friday noon, April 4th, but it did not.
Group work discussions
The participants were divided up into there groups each to discuss all three main questions: 1) The ideal solution; its principles and main components; 2) A Workable compromise to all parties/conflict players; and 3) Analysis of the UN: Strengths and weaknesses. They spent about one and a half hour discussing, analysing and then presented their findings in an interactive environment. The following section presents their findings in a bullet-point format, in a group by group basis:
Group One:
The ideal solution: unconditional dialogue; Its principles: an MoU with a guarantor; Main components: Ceasefire; power sharing; and the implementation of a number of transitional tasks.
Group One recommended a ceasefire; complete African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) deployment; Ethiopian withdrawal; joint security arrangement between the TFG and the ARS; power sharing; and finally UN help with the transitional tasks as a workable compromise in their deliberations.
Finally, Group One looked at the UN’s strength and weaknesses and came up with the following lists: Strengths: momentum; possible US support and back up; a high degree of willingness; the UN Envoy’s methodology, i.e., the shuttle secret diplomacy so far; the UN’s impartiality and its expertise. Its weaknesses also included: its lack of a leverage over the actors; the problem associated with the early 1990’s scenario; possible policy implications, i.e., other countries’ influence and interests; the problem with the UN framework and the associated bureaucracy; the information black-out which can also be seen as a strength; the lack of coordination and information-sharing among internationals, for example the UN Security Council meeting in New York and the International Contact Group meeting in Oslo within the same month of April; and finally the fact that the roles of the AU, EU/EC, AL, IGAD, ICG which is not clear within this initiative.
Group Two:
Group Two put the ideal solution as giving a chance to all actors in order to unify their ideas and positions towards Somali reconciliation and that there is a need to initiate dialogue without conditions. They set a number of principles too: local Somali ownership; respect for unity the need to avoid further fragmentation; and the development of an effective time-frame with strict deadlines.
Group Two came up with a number of suggestions as the workable compromise if peace is to be achieved in Somalia and these include: the formation of governmental of national unity; power-sharing deal between the two actors, the TFG and the ARS; a possible UN peace-keeping and peace-enforcement mission excluding Somalia’s neighbours.
Finally, Group Two saw the acceptance of the reconciliation process by both sides; the international support and interest and the UN’s leading role in this initiative as strengths for the UN. Similarly, Group Two saw the lack of grassroots participation and consultation; the possible internal fragmentation and external interference of and in either side of the conflicting groups; the current US war on terror; and the fact that process is taking place outside Somalia as a weakness for this UN-led initiative.
Group Three:
Group Three saw the formation of an inclusive and democratically-elected government in Somalia as the ideal solution to the current Somali crisis. The argued that its main principles must contain a number of points including among others: recognition; an agreed and neutral mediator with the right carrot-and-stick; cessation of hostilities; unconditional humanitarian aid, access and delivery both by local groups and the international community; inclusivity both government and opposition; and finally, a UN peace-keeping force with a clear mandate and clear rules of engagement.
The group members agreed that fair consultation; good approach; and neutrality would pass for the UN’s strengths as opposed to its weaknesses which the group members had to relate to Somalia’s past experiences toward the UN operations in the early 1990s, i.e. no trust, no faith and confidence in the UN; that the UN focused on the government and the opposition; that its approach was a ‘wait and see;’ and that they mostly dealt with the wrong people.
Finally, Group Three came up with a number of points as a workable compromise including: inclusivity, the need for unconditional talks; impartial mediation; a fully-coordinated international support; the declaration of a truce and enforcement mechanisms; and a systematic approach to end conflict in Somalia.
Summary and conclusions
The participants further discussed the role of civil society with a general agreement that civil society is a victim of Somali political actors’ forum shopping exercises. Civil society has power without which the warlords would not have it. The civil society cannot participate in the political processes due to the fact that power-sharing is based on the 4.5 clan formula. Both the TFG and opposition groups deal with civil society with the same mentality despite its majority. There is a lack of coordination among civil society groups in Somalia nor a union that advocates for an active civic role.
The definitional problem of ‘reconciliation’ was also discussed further. There was a call for a totally different formula for ‘reconciliation’ this time: one that focuses on the reality on the ground. Finally, the role of NCF was put to question and an agreement made that NCF had to do more than holding workshops and disseminating its panel discussions and findings. The discussion of civil society also led to the participants and NCF agreeing that it will be the work of the next Panel.