NCF Somali

 Silver Spring Hotel, Nairobi Kenya, May 30^th 2009

 With threats against the Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi in its alleged biased interest in a coastal waters dispute between Kenya and Somalia to the developments beyond the Somalia border, many developments have happened in Somalia of late. Abdullahi Yusuf left office in late 2008, a new government of national unity was put together, and security has become an issue. There is also a new government in ‘Puntland,’ upcoming elections in ‘Somaliland’ are critical, the issue of piracy off the Somali coast and more importantly on the ‘Puntland’ corridor has been overestimated stealing the show and international attention from the more needed peace reconciliation processes at the national level, and Alshabab has become a thorn in the Somali flesh. Humanitarian assistance, both access and delivery but also security, are of regional impact with cyclical droughts and floods not helping out while the country is also partially affected by the global economic recession. Most of these issues if not all of them have become challenges to peace in Somalia and to stability and development to the Horn of Africa region.

 As part of its monthly interventions, the Nairobi-based National Civic Forum (NCF) invited a group of Somali panelists in a discussion on “Somalia: Developments, challenges and a call for peace” at the Silver Springs Hotel in Nairobi. The participants deliberated on current developments in Somalia, challenges to peace and made a call for peace at the end of the day-long panel discussion. The following section aims to provide a summary of the key points discussed.

1. Deliberations

2.1 Security

South-central Somalia is worse than any other part of Somalia in terms of security ranking, Mogadishu in particular. There an armed Islamist insurgency fighting the new government. There is piracy in ‘Puntland’ which is resulted by the high rate of unemployment in that region while the international community is also reluctant to see it as part and parcel of the Somali crisis and focus on the national level in terms of reconstruction & development and institutional development. ‘Somaliland’ gives the best picture in all over the country: there are perorations for the upcoming elections, their economy is booming, although there is some level of political instability it is still not a major issue, and they are doing a great job.

Much of South-central Somalia is in the hands of Alshabab with the warlords becoming the biggest losers in this equation. Some people even argue that Alshabab is now doing Ethiopia’s job basically because of their continued warfare in Somalia even after their withdrawal. Kenya, on the other hand, is concerned with the security of its porous border with Somalia and possible infiltration onto the Kenyan side of the border by the insurgents. The Kenyan media is also either ignorant or biased and this is dangerous because they are misreporting on developments in Somalia. There is therefore need to balance this picture and provide the true picture of developments in Somalia and their security implications in Kenya which may not be that negative if closely studied and objectively reported on.

Conflict in Somalia and attempts to manage is a continued process where NCF must have had to use its soft power since it was intimately engaged in the Djibouti process. I this case, there is also a need to support the government and die for its cause. Meetings in Nairobi about Somalia and the government are of no use. It is time for deeds and not words. The process needs to be Somali owned despite the fact that the Ethiopians are still doing their job. The Djibouti process was great as it took the reconciliation (and more so the power-sharing process) to a pint of no return. Its product was good as it brought together former government elements and new figures from the Islamist insurgents and other opposition figures into a coalition arrangement. This gives us a government that is willing (and has already approved at both its cabinet and the parliament) to implement Sharia in Somalia. This is itself quite significant and historic.

2.2 The Djibouti process and its impact

The Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) was the product of the Djibouti process and its president enjoys the support of the international community and a certain degree of popular Somali support. But, while the Somali crisis and its related processes are part of the international community’s agenda, the Somali government is yet to come up with one single policy document on what plans they have for Somalia and beyond. It is also the feeling of some of the participants that the government’s dialogue strategy had failed and that there was need to work on anew strategy towards dialogue ad other key transitional tasks they have to implement between now and the end of its term which is August 2011.

The government needs to focus on the current conflict and resolve it. It must use the experience to resolve the rest. This can be both by use of peace and reconciliation or force of arms, no matter which approach. CSOs will also have to be given their role and have them move out of the vicious cycle of war, peace, war etc. While local reconciliation and other processes must continue at the grassroots level, the government needs to develop sense of nationalism in its citizenry. This will have a greater positive impact in getting the country out of the current mess.

2.3 ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Punt land’

On the issue of Somaliland and Puntland, there can be no regional authorities or secession for any of the two without the approval of Mogadishu thus emphasizing the importance of focusing Mogadishu, the capital and South-central Somalia. The civil society organizations will also have to play their role despite its territorial and clan-based nature. The focus on piracy off the Somali coast is too much. This level of attention is required at the centre of stage which is reconciliation and other transitional tasks in Mogadishu and beyond since it is only when we find lasting peace that the rest can be tackled with the help of the Somali government. This also stresses the importance of addressing root causes of the Somali crisis and not the consequences. While the 200 plus pirates who recently denounced piracy is welcoming, there is a need to continue building on local mechanisms to further the cause for peace. For example, the international community can work towards the formation of a tribunal in order to try former warlords and other criminals who have committed crimes against humanity in Somalia including non-Somali actors from the early 1990s to-date.

2.4 Kenya and Ethiopia

On the domestic political side of Somalia, opposition groups need to be recognized since there can be no healthy political processes. The government, on the other hand, will have to use dialogue as a tool to advance the reconciliation process and since the Somali conflict is part and parcel of a Horn of Africa conflict system Nairobi and Addis Ababa must be brought onboard. For example the Kenyan media and Ethiopia’s military thinking as a lasting solution to its historical problem with Somalia will have to be neutralized through education and quiet diplomacy respectively. There are a number of Somali nationals holding key positions in both countries that need to be reached out. With their help, the two countries media and military can be educated but also peacefully approached. This is the role of the Diaspora and the role of the members of the civil society. Kenya, on the other hand, has something to offer. There are many lessons that can be drawn from its post-electoral violence and how it was politically resolved. The same goes for its ongoing national healing processes.

 2.5 Civil society, the Diaspora, and NCF’s role

There is a definitional problem related with the term civil society at least in a Somalia context and it needs to make its role clear. Both the CSOs’ role and that of the Diaspora, do not, however, stop there. They need to play their role as ‘binding glue’ between government and opposition groups throughout Somalia. In Somaliland and in Puntland, they are doing fine, of course with some problems but of no major issue. NCF’s role, on the other hand, is one of ‘break it or make it’ in such a critical situation. The message from the panelists was that “civic agenda must supercede the rest and from a civil society perspective.” NCF and their civics must move beyond peace calls. There is need for action this time. CSOs role is also to enlighten the Somali public that “the Somali people have got nobody to wait for anymore.”

2.6 Developments on the international scene

Asmara’s isolation is no good picture and so is its alleged military support to Somali insurgents in order to outsmart Ethiopia on Somali soil and vice versa. IGAD proposed sanctions on Eritrea and the air and sea blockage on Alshabab-controlled areas in Somalia. The AU bought the idea and proposed to the UN for similar action. Eritrea denies but they are allegedly supporting the armed insurgency in and around Mogadishu especially since Dahir Aweys returned to Somalia a month ago. The UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), on the other hand, is the lead on Somali politics in the international community. The main problem is that it aligns itself with US interests as opposed to Somali interests. The US is interested in counter-terrorism in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa and although there is a new knowledgeable on its Africa desk, its agenda is still unclear, very unclear.

One major conclusion one can draw is the fact that there can be no major policy shift expected from most international partners as long as the situation is as chaotic as unit is now. Ethiopia is playing more of an active role within IGAD and the AU, Asmara is reluctant, Egypt is silent and so are the Italians and we expect more of IGAD developments towards Somalia. This is due to the fact that the international community has taken different direction than the government’s. Time is running out for Asmara on the other hand since it may face sanctions at the UN level and possibly action by the United States if not a break up of the Ethio-Eritrea war all over again. Finally, external interests and those of Somalia should merge and the Somali government and other authorities, i.e. ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland,’ need to come up with strategies to cope with such competing and contradicting interest. This is also to be taken seriously and implemented urgently since it is based on the fact “there is no time left to waste and/or wait for an ideal time to come, it is either now or never.”

1. Challenges to peace in Somalia

The participants split into two groups, discussed challenges to peace in Somalia and came up with the following:

-          Absence of viable leadership/elite

-          Lack of internal capacity

-          Absence of official executive power

-          Weak civic actors

-          Consistent external interference

-          Negative government policies or lack of them at all

-          Untapped potential

-          Radicalization of Islam

-          Politicization of the Somali clan system

-          The Djibouti process being no inclusive

-          Questions about its ownership

-          Reconciliation vs. power-sharing and which was which?

-           Clan vs. regional identities in Somalia

-          Competition between external interests

-          External as well as internal priorities

-          Lack of independence for Somali issues

-          Misinterpretation of Islam

-          Claims of Somali ownership

-          War being unavoidable  

1. Recommendations

The groups also came up with a number of recommendations to remedy the situation and these included:

-          Reconciliation, peace-building (PB) and dialogue as a tool

-          Nurturing new leadership and a sense of nationalism

-          Promotion of education

-          The development of a political culture that can counter external interference and other competing interests both internal and external

-          Continued humanitarian assistance to IDPs and others in need

-          Somali ownership

-          Long-term goals in order to avoid dependency

-          Prioritizing Somali needs

-          Promoting Islamic studies widely

-          The Somali government must take lead role and be the driving force for security issues while AMISOM plays only a back up role

1. Next steps

As part of the participants recommendations, NCF was tasked to hold another discussion, this time in a forum, the following day and deliberate on “Security and other key transitional tasks” awaiting for the government.

Similarly, NCF was asked to issue a press statement and “Appeal or A Call for peace”.

End. 

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