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May 2010, Nairobi Kenya
Somalia is poised to earn the dubious distinction of sustaining the longest civil war in the continent if no solution is found soon to the on-going strife in the country. The Transitional Federal Government – in power since January 2009 following the successful election of Sheikh Sharif at the conclusion of a UN backed Peace Process and elections in Djibouti -seems to be fighting for its life both militarily and politically. An armed onslaught launched by two insurgent groups – Al-Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam – continue to ‘eat away’ at the territorial and moral Authority of the Government.
The presence in the country of an African Union Force –AMISOM and the perceived influence that the International Community has over the Government has not resulted into the stability of the Government in any significant way. The civilian casualties attributed to the shelling by AMISOM are not helping matters in respect to the government’s winning of ‘hearts and minds’ of the Somali people.
The government is attracting criticism both from within and outside the country in its perceived ambivalent approach to reconciliation efforts. Eye brows have been raised specifically in the way the government has mis-handled its alliance with the Ahlu-Sunnah Waljama’a group and some local Authority heads and Elders. Concern has also been expressed regarding the little attention shown towards the members of the Somali Security Forces.
Perhaps the greater concern is the speed with which the government has squandered the Goodwill that welcomed it into office. The Civil Society feel ignored and their programmes to provide the much needed social services impeded. The ‘Clan factor’ remains rife while the Government of National Unity that was crafted in Djibouti and on the basis upon which the 550 – Member parliament was agreed to has shown no significant signs of harmony in its functions. More significantly, it is felt that on both sides of the political divide in Somalia – TFG as well as the Armed Opposition Groups – Foreign voices and interests have ‘majority share’
There are positive outcomes too within the Somali Society attributed to the government and which must be consolidated and not allowed to go to waste. Primary among this is the international recognition of Somalia that has intensified since the coming to power of the TGF Government. It has also been noted that the current TFG Government is more sensitive to Human Rights requirements than its predecessors.
Civil Society groups still have some significant avenues to influence positive action from the government and should explore and adopt those relevant to specific situation. For Instance, the Civil Society could endeavor to mediate and bridge the gap between the TFG and the Ahlu Sunnah Wajama’a. The Civil Society could also lobby the International Community to bring pressure to bear upon the Government to improve its record of Service Delivery. The current TFG could be the opportunity to lead Somalia out of its political crisis of two decades or the impediment to the people acting for themselves. The Civil Society is best placed to offer a constructive way forward.
2. Background
The Somali Civil Society had Observer status in the Reconciliation Talks between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in Djibouti in 2008. The Talks ended with the formation (at least on paper) of an inclusive 550 seat parliament and the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed to the Presidency at the end of that year. In this power-sharing arrangement, the TFG was to take 275 seats, the ARS 200 seats with the remaining 75 seats going to the Civil Society, the business community and the youth.
Between November and December 2008, the NCF discussed the most appropriate way to contribute to the Somali peace process. Between November 29th and December 13th, the NCF convened three Round Tables which discussed the Civil Society participation in the Government as per the Djibouti Peace Talks. These Talks were concluded with the production of the Civic Agenda for Peace which was shared in the Djibouti Talks. The Panel Discussions convened by the NCF on May 1st 2010 offer a Platform to Somali Intellectuals, Professionals and Civil Society Personalities present in Nairobi to exchange views on the achievements or otherwise of the TFG II eighteen Months since its formation.
3. OBJECTIVES
3.1 To identify and acknowledge the achievements of the TFG II since its formation
3.2 To identify and acknowledge the gaps between the achievements and the Peoples’ Expectations of the TFG II
3.3 To identify and consider the challenges facing the TFG II
3.4 To recommend Ways and Means for bridging the gap between the TFG II and the People.
4. METHODOLOGY
The Meeting which was held on May 1st 2010 at the Silver Springs Hotel, Nairobi, adopted an open plenary format of discussion. A Moderator was appointed to guide the discussion and rapporteur to take notes. The Proceedings were broken into two Sessions. The first Session commenced at 11:15 am and closed at 1:00 pm for Lunch and Prayers. The Second Session commenced at 2:00 pm and closed at 4:30 pm.
5. ASSESSING 16MONTHS OF TFG II
The Meeting explored a number of proposals on how best to discuss the topic and resolved to assess the performance of the TFG in 4 areas believed by the participants to be critical to the Somali Socio-political order. These are Security, Political Arena, Institution Building and Social Service. It was further resolved that the discussions examine the Achievements made so far, the existing gaps and propose Recommendations in respect of each area or category of discussion.
5.1 Security
The meeting spent a significant portion of the meeting time debriefing one another and debating the prevailing situation in respect to Security. Given the fact that Mogadishu is the Seat of the TFG II and the hub of the on-going political contest, it attracted most comments and significant focus. Other Regions of South-Central Somalia too featured – albeit in less detail as did Somaliland and Puntland as well.
5.1.1 Achievements
The participants of the panel discussion acknowledged the efforts made by the TFG II to unify the Former TFG and ARS Forces (which operated essentially operated as Militias???) into a single National Force and the expansion of government – controlled areas in Mogadishu. The establishment of government security Forces in the Regions was equally acknowledged and lauded. Specifically, 6 out of 16 Districts in Mogadishu are under government control and include, Shangaani, Hanar Weyne, Hamr Jabjab, Waaberi, Wadajir and Madina. The TFG has also partial control of some districts like Bondheere (Shangani Police); Abdiaziz (Bari Station);
The number of Armed Forces available to the TFG II when they took over was roughly placed at 1000. This number has been topped up by AMISOM and locally recruited and trained Somali soldiers and now brings the total to well above 5000 Soldiers. Forces managed by AMISOM in Medina are best organized and are of mixed clans and include former Aviators and they are able to effectively defend themselves against opposition forces.
It was noted that unlike the Military, the Police did have an operational Structure and entertained discussions and Interventions on Human Rights
5.1.2 Gaps
The TFG II has lost some territory to its opponents. For instance Bay, Bakool and Middle Shabelle which were under TFG control in early 2009 were taken over by Al-Shabaab. The armed challenges mounted against the government by it opponents have restricted the movement of the people – especially within the city – and confined the government to some risky kilometers.
The government Armed Defense Campaign is characterized by its apparent inability to exploit and effectively deploy the Forces under its command, poor structures (lack of basic Units and Human Rights awareness), under utilization and neglect of Somali Officers, clashes within its own Forces, irregular and poor pay and poor conditions of service. These have in some instances led to mutiny and defection to opposing Forces.
It was also noted that no criteria governed the selection and deployment of Recruits for training overseas leading to many would be trainees being returned home on medical grounds including that of HIV and TB infections.
The Transition from Clan Militia identity to National Force identity is not very apparent as integration is very slow in the absence of a unified Command. Most of the 4,000 Police Officers reported by the UNDP to have been trained are said to be clan Militia and are deployed to protect Government Officials like Ministers. This is manifested by the existence in the Military as Officers, of some known militia “Moriyans”
5.1.3 Recommendations
It is recommended that:
1. The Government re-engages former Somali Army/Police Officers who can act directly or as advisers,
2. The Government contacts existing hospitals and arrange for free treatment for the soldiers and pay the hospitals directly
3. The Government unifies the source of funding and rationalizes pay for the Forces. Funding can influence the forces’ command
4. The civil societies play a mediatory role and keep talking to the Government and the insurgents.
5. The Government consider introducing the Concept and activate Community Policing
6. The government should strengthen the regional relations and not only focus on Mogadishu.
5.2 Political Arena
The Meeting analyzed the political situation from the perspective of the TFG relationship with the Public in Mogadishu, other Regions of South-Central, the Autonomous Region of Puntland, the break-away Republic of Somaliland, IGADD States and the International Community
5.2.1 Achievements
The Meeting noted that the TFG II’s initial attempts at reconciliation represented an achievement as did the establishment of the Seat of Government in Mogadishu and the attraction of international support which is manifested by the training of the Police Force.
The apparent display of unity of purpose among the TFG II leaders, the operations of the Media such as Radio Mogadishu (ran by the Ministry of Information), Horn Afrik and Radio Shabelle were also acknowledged as Achievements. There has been an open popular defiance of and even struggle against the Al-Shabaab in Bay and Bakool regions specifically in El-Berde where the residents perceive TFG forces as providing a refuge for and safe-guarding the freedoms of the populations in those regions.
While noting that the Civil Society could deal with the TFG II and even challenge it more openly that in the past, the Meeting also highlighted some constraints. It was also noted that loyalty TFG II has shown towards the International Community presents the Civil Society with the opportunity to influence it through lobbying the International Community.
Existing collaboration between Institutions of Higher Learning and the Business Communities in South – Central, Puntland and Somaliland contradicts the notion of Somaliland as exclusivist and presents a ray of hope for possible cooperation in the political field as well.
5.2.2 Gaps
All the above notwithstanding, the weak links that define the TFG II – Public relations were highlighted. For instance, even though the TFG II leadership had Religious Credentials and Links, these have not been translated into strengths. This is further compounded by the minimum or absent Legal mandate by which Institutions other than the President and Parliament attempt to operate – leaving the cabinet speaking on many occasions and issues beyond its Mandate. TFG also appears to be far-removed from the people when it appears to be tolerating the AMISOM shellings of Residential Areas which often result in civilian Casualties that include women and children.
Although initially based on the 4.5 Clan representation formula, the MPs neither represent nor account to their clans claiming the seats to themselves. Some of them may have been supported by interested foreign governments. They seek Clan support only when they find themselves in difficulties. On the other hand, the 4.5 formula applied in the appointment of Cabinet ministers appears to have conferred cabinet position to specific clans.
Although TFG II was formed with expectations to govern the whole country, the actual standing of the government has been much less than expected. TFG seems to have failed to present itself as a national institution. The MPs are sometimes clan representatives and other times representative of the citizen, appearing confused in the process.
The Government appears not to have any priorities in their plans rarely takes action on recommendations from Civil Society. The TFG component of Government appears very passive and less visible .The TFG conduct of Government does not express the zeal and enthusiasm of a people entrusted to lead the country out of the turmoil. They are yet to lead the people towards big goals; have so far failed to translate the international support (which they have failed to utilize) into concrete actions.
Public-government relation between the TFG and Somali peoples’ Institutions - especially the Elders such as the Adado Council - is missing. The Diaspora which has also supported the government through payment of salaries have also faired similarly. This aloofness is best dramatized by the experience of the Governor of Hiraan who, despite camping in Mogadishu for three months was ignored by the Government and left without being seen. He defected to the opposition upon his return to Hiraan. Equal treatment has been meted to Ahlusunna militia; who seem to be mobilized only when the Government is threatened by Al-Shabab. Ahlusunna was forced to go to Addis.
It is now apparent that TFG did not earnestly pursue reconciliation with Hizbul Islam. The internal disputes prevents focus on real issues, TFG continues to embrace wrong reconciliation strategies – opting to deal with War-Lords. The International assistance consisting mainly of tons of weapons rather than finances continues to raise questions regarding its utilization as Somalis are excluded from decision-making positions in the International Organizations.
The UN Secretary General Special Representative to Somalia Ould Abdallah appears to be the challenge to the emergence of a strong government in Somalia and may have obstructed Puntland from participating in the Djibouti process. His perceived attitude may also have prevented him from mediating between TFG and Hizbul Islam and to attempt a rapprochement with Al-Shabaab. He appears to act as an Ambassador to Somalia for Ethiopia or other countries. The apparent close relations between TFG and Puntland may be the result of his being kept out.
TFG complains from lack of support; accusing business people of supporting the Opposition while the Opposition on the other hand demand from the same business people equal contribution to that given to TFG - putting the business sector in a difficult situation.
While there has been propagation for a Federal form of government in Somalia, it is clear that Federalism may only be advocated for by Parties who need guarantees for their rights under a unitary state. Somalia may never be a true Federal state due to the complexity of a Federal System which then becomes too complex for Somalia. This is borne out of the experience gained during the attempts by the Siad Barre government to demarcate village boundaries. Due to the fact that Somalia is fragmented, focus should not be placed on Somaliland.
5.2.3 Recommendations
As a way towards recapturing some of the political momentum, it is recommended that:
- Civil society embarks on lobbying the Government and the International Community rather than only providing recommendations to the government.
2. Government be reminded that TFG is a Platform for achieving the goals of the people and Cabinet is reminded of its purpose.
3. The process to select MPs and civil servants should be streamlined
- Engagement with Al-Shabab should be considered with further thoughts being devoted on determining who to talk to Al-Shabaab , whether to talk to Hizbul I slam first and who to lead the Talks?
5.3 Institutional Building
The Meeting did not identify any achievements under this heading.
5.3.1 Gaps
The Meeting however noted the following gaps:
Institutions such as Parliament, the Prime Minister’s Office and the President exhibited uncoordinated actions with the Prime Minister appearing to be outside the axis of power with Sheikh Sharif, Sharif Hassan and Adan Madhobe appearing to be the only ones wielding real power.
The Meeting wondered why the security situation was in the shape outlined above and whether the situation could have been caused by lack of political will. resources? technical capacities? Or whether it was due to Political interference? It was noted that resources – some of which are directly managed by the US – are available and what was not very visible were strategies and plans. For instance, while only 1 Million US Dollars was needed for security in Mogadishu, this could not be made available in spite of the fact that the Port of Mogadishu brought in about 1.8 Million US Dollars in revenue.
The Problems in Somalia were summarized as follows:
1. Dadxumo - They have been drawn from clans; they do not think as a nation; TFG is transitional, but acts as a permanent institution.
2. Mismanagement, embezzlement of resources and residences in Nairobi.
3. Misplaced or absent concept of government which makes TFG more accountable to the international community than the Somali people.
4. All components of the TFG have been recruiting staff independently; leading to departments with several nominated heads.
5.3.2 Recommendations
It was recommended that:
1. Preparation of the people to replace the current system should commence.
2. The TFG should acknowledge its transitional status and focus on transitional tasks
5.4 Social Services
Given the many years in which Somalia has been without any centralized state, the provision of Social welfare and amenities has mainly been the preserve of the Private sector and Civil Society Organizations. Consequently, the Meeting analyzed this category on the basis of the involvement of Civil Society Organizations – especially NGOs
5.4.1 Achievements
The Meeting could not identify and acknowledge any achievement of the TFG in respect of the promotion of Social Services
5.4.2 Gaps
Registration of NGOs during the Presidency of Abdullahi Yusuf was US $ 135 for NGOs and schools. The new TFG ordered fresh registration pegging the fee at US $ 500. With no central policy on registration, Ministries sought to have NGOs perceived to be under their Ministries register under them. Further the TFG instructed international community not to engage any NGOs not registered with TFG. Consequently, the Minster of Interior blocked Italian money meant for Central Regions.
5.4.3 Recommendations
It is recommended as follows:
1. TFG should lift pressure off NGOs
6. Closing Remarks
The Meeting was adjourned at 4:30 pm by the NCF Chair of Board of Directors who thanked the Participants for taking part in the Panel discussion which he called an educational Debate. He said that the purpose of the debate was to contribute to the search for a functioning Somali Government and promised that the outcomes of the debate would be conveyed to the TFG. He noted the importance of the contributions made by Participants who had attended from Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia. He said that the ideas generated during NCF Meetings are intended for action at appropriate times through appropriate structures. He lauded the time spent raising issues but urged the participants to also invest their time in implementing some of the solutions as well.
In conclusion he said that from time to time NCF brings together Somalis from diverse backgrounds and mainly living in Nairobi to discuss the goings on in Somalia. In this respect, the NCF had conducted critical analysis of the Djibouti process and concluded a General Assembly in 2009 through which new Professionals were elected onto the Board.
NCF has a Membership of 30 whose Participation and involvement is purely voluntary. The Chairman appealed to the Participants to also offer their time to voluntarily serve the cause of NCF. NCF receives support from the Heinrich Boll Foundation (HBF) and some funding from the European Commission (EC) and the German Government.
He invited those interested to apply for membership as NCF doors were open. The NCF Secretariat is lean and is currently led by Dr. Abdullahi Haider as Executive Director and a Coordinator ….. New members of the Executive include Ms. Qoran (Treasurer) and Mr. Ugas (Secretary).
National Civic Forum, May 2010
Moderator: Mohamed Ahmed Sheikh Ali
Rapporteur: Abdulrahman M. Wandati
7. Annexes
a. List of Participants