^{Barakat Hotel, Nairobi Kenya August 20th, 2009} 

 Somalia, the real horn in Eastern Africa, is home for nearly eleven million people[1] made up of four (4) main clans and a clan grouping of many minorities. Its population has been subjected to decades of intensive inter and intra-clan violence. The country and its people are vulnerable to severe cyclical droughts and floods which contribute to widespread poverty and malnutrition. The humanitarian situation and that of human rights have been adverse and dire throughout the country and especially in the south-central.

 

From the early 1980s, there was a rapid deterioration of Somalia’s economic situation; armed resistance against the former Somali government weakened the humanitarian situation of overall Somalia. In 1988, under pressure by the superpowers, Somalia and Ethiopia signed a peace treaty. This was followed by an open outbreak of civil war in northwestern Somalia that had seized the whole of Somalia by 1991 and soon the Somali government fell. This was followed by a broad collapse of public order in most of South-central Somalia, especially in Mogadishu. Similarly, ‘Somaliland’ declared independence from the rest of Somalia in May 1991. At the regional level, Ethiopia’s Mengistu was overthrown in May the same year and in 1993, Eritrea declared independence and won it through a national referendum facilitated by the new Ethiopian leadership. Since then, the humanitarian situation has never improved.

According to the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, Mr. Mark Bowden, Somalia is the “world’s second largest humanitarian crisis, and one of the most politically complex.” Due to a confluence of the nineteen years of conflict, droughts, escalating violence, higher priced-fuel and inflation, aid agencies and workers can not mount effective operations. This is basically due to the level of insecurity and the recent targeted assassinations against aid workers.

In conflict hotspots such as South-central Somalia the mass displacement of civilians, mainly women and children is un-abated. Chronic humanitarian crisis has affected major cities like Mogadishu, Kismayo, Hargeisa, Baidoa, and Garowe. Since the collapse of the former Somali central government, the country has had quite a number of challenges including steep rise in price of essential food commodities, principally rice which is the principle staple food for most Somalis. While this phenomenon and the overall global economic recession, rural communities have become vulnerable and the impact has been severe. Similarly, the Somali business sector has also been facing serious difficulties buying and selling both in Somalia and outside. Those able to survive are urban families with access to remittances from relatives abroad. On the other hand Pastoralists from remote regions of the country whose livestock have been decimated by consecutive droughts are, flocking to major towns with little prospect of obtaining food and other help.

The value of the Somali shilling has, on the other hand, eroded dramatically, compounding the poverty of those already in dire need and at the same time sparking unrest in most major urban centers. The US dollar is currently the main currency for business transactions throughout the country exchanging for approximately 30,000 Somali shillings. Billions of counterfeit Somalia banknotes printed in Mogadishu and in the self-autonomous Puntland region have created hyperinflation with both urban families and most traders unwilling to accept the shilling and the dollar becoming the first choice for most major transactions[2].

The drought has been severe across the country, but especially in the South - central regions notably in Hiran, Galgadud, Middle and Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakol and Gedo. The agricultural belts in the Juba Corridor have been less affected. Transporters have been hit by the sharp increase in fuel prices and the growing insecurity and proliferation of checkpoints manned by armed insurgents, ‘government’ soldiers, and other freelance militia forces throughout South-central. This means food that reaches remote towns and villages is usually priced above the means of the poor, the consequence being a dramatic increase in malnutrition across the country.

Piracy is the other major issue. Some people argue that it is an obstacle caused by the international community for not supporting Somalia to regain its dignity and central government and whose policies are so far not clear. The confluence of these conflicting policies has made the waters off the Somali coast to be ranked the world’s number one piracy hotspot. For example, the 83 reported attacks on ships along the Somali waters, in the third quarter of 2008 and early 2009, accounted for nearly a third of all such attacks worldwide. Different arguments aside, the international preoccupation with piracy appears to be so hypocritical to many in view of the longstanding and rarely challenged practice of foreign entities to fish illegally and dump toxic waste on the long porous unmanned Somali coast.

2.0            Introduction: The ‘Complex’ Humanitarian Situation in Somalia

 

A UN endorsed and US - led mission to help stabilize Somalia was launched in late 1992 following the deterioration of the humanitarian situation. This was overtaken by UN sanctioned UNOSOM I and II. However, this operation which aimed to provide humanitarian aid and restore stability in Somalia failed miserably. UNOSOM forces were not able to reach out to the needy and vulnerable population in Somalia. Subsequently, in October 1993, there were raging battles in Mogadishu between US and UN forces on one side and the late Gen. Aideed on the other. In the aftermath, eighteen US soldiers and thousands of Somalis, many of them non-combatant women and children, were killed in the failed operation to arrest the late Gen. Aideed. In March 1994, there was a subsequent shift in US strategy when all western troops were withdrawn from Somalia. As a result, civil war was rekindled and contributed greatly in the weakening of the already deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia. Similarly, in March 1995, UNOSOM II officially closed its operations in Somalia worsening the already fragile humanitarian situation. In 1998 the SSDF handed over the reins of power after the self - proclamation of the autonomous region of ‘Puntland’ under Abdullahi Yusuf as its president.

 

In 2000, the Djibouti-led “Somali National Peace Conference” was held in Arta, Djibouti and led to the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia. Put under President Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the TNG found little local acceptance in its four years in power. During this time, the humanitarian situation of the country remained worse. A high level of lawlessness in the country led to another reconciliation conference in Eldoret, Kenya in late 2002. This process continued for two years, from 2002 to 2004. With a clan-based representation in a Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), the process selected Abdullahi Yusuf (leader of the autonomous region of ‘Puntland’ at the time) as president in October 2004. While local communities were weathering the vagaries of bad season, inflation, droughts that caused crop failure this government had no clear agenda for humanitarian aid. In 2006, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and parliament was relocated from Kenya first to Jowhar and later to Baidoa in Somalia, basically for security reasons. With Ethiopian military support, the TFG later on moved to Mogadishu after the emergence of an armed Islamist group called the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) who ruled Mogadishu and much of South-central Somalia.

The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and counter-terrorism (ARTPCT) was formed in Mogadishu in February 2006 by a group of warlords and businesspeople with pressure and support of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, immediately thereafter heavy fighting broke out in December 2006 between the TFG and ICU militiamen. The latter were controlling parts of Mogadishu at the time and the hitherto recovering humanitarian aid situation was made worse. Subsequently, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1725, expressing its support for a regional peacekeeping operation in Somalia. By then, the ICU was launching attacks around Baidoa. At the request of the TFG, Ethiopian forces launched a military offensive on the ICU in Mogadishu and much of South-central where the latter held control. By the end of the year, the ICU was defeated and driven out of the capital by the Ethiopian military. As a result, some ICU leaders and troops retreated to southern Somalia making Kismayo and Ras Kiamboni their final stronghold. This heavy fighting between the ICU forces on one side and the TFG and its Ethiopian military backer on the other, and the subsequent retreat to the southern side of the country occurred in the midst of a humanitarian emergency due to cyclical wars and a combination of severe drought and the devastating floods that followed. This emergency created heavy internal displacement and became a great obstruction to the delivery of the much needed humanitarian assistance.

From 2008 onwards, the unknown elements started attacks against aid workers sooner after the United States’ enlisting of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization (in March 2008) on the one hand and the killing of one of the Al-Shabaab key leaders, Aden Ayro, by a U.S. missile strike on a safe house in Dhusamareb district in May 2008. In addition, Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia after the signing of the agreement by the ARS, Sheikh Sharif’s wing, and TFG’s Nur Adde’s government. On the humanitarian front, the Dutch navy ended its escort services for the WFP sponsored food relief - carrying ships in June 2008. This led to WFP’s warning that it might have to stop deliveries altogether.

In early 2009, members from TFG and ARS gathered in Djibouti for a new round of talks. This resulted with the expansion of the transitional federal parliament from 275 to 550, half of which would come from the ARS wing. Sheikh Sharif was also elected as a president and immediately appointed the son of the late Sharma’arke, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, as prime minister. Thereafter Sheikh Sharif relocated to Mogadishu where disagreements with the former ICU worsened. After this fall out members from Al- Shaabab started launching their war against the new government led by Sheikh Sharif, targeting all government officials and journalists, aid workers and therefore making everybody vulnerable to their attacks and humanitarian access difficult in Mogadishu in particular and Somalia in general.

On June 16^th 2009, more violence in Mogadishu’s Karan and Hodan districts between government forces and insurgents killed at least 30 people, including the Mogadishu police chief while more than 120 others were wounded. According to UNHCR, the total number of IDPs from Mogadishu alone since 7 May 2009 was nearly 126,000 people. Given the new spate of violence even the largest in-patient facility in South-central Somalia was closed[3] while a suicide car bomb killed at least 34 people, including the Minister for Internal Security in Beletweyn, Hiran. Field sources indicate that more than 30 people were injured in the incident. Similarly, while Kenya’s border has been officially closed since early 2007 there has been growing tension along the Kenyan/Somali border between Kenyan military forces and Somali Islamists. This, however, has not slowed the pace of new asylum seekers arriving at Dadaab refugee camp. According to OCHA field reports, since the recent fighting started in Mogadishu, increasing number of Somalis are crossing the border.

3.0            Forum Discussions

 

3.1            Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: Key Issues

(a)  Decline of Humanitarian Space:

The impact of growing insecurity on the humanitarian situation is severe[4]. The delivery of aid to the 3.2 million Somalis in need has been seriously reduced as NGO workers, both national and international, have become prime targets. Although, this violence has principally been stemming from grudges of some local groups against some relief agencies some insurgent groups are deliberately organizing this violence focusing aid workers. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières lost three staff for the first time in a bomb attack in January 2008. MSF activities in Bakol included the Health Centre in Hudur which has provided 272,700 outpatient consultations since 2002 and four outlying health posts in Labatan Jirow, Ceel Garas, Ceel Berde and Rubdhure. This was a serious setback for the region as the International Medical Corps was forced by Al-Shabaab to suspend all their activities (mainly nutrition interventions) in the area in October 2008.

 

 

(b)  Security Situation:

The new wave of aggression and hostilities against humanitarian aid workers in Somalia is putting the lives of children and women at great risk. A press statement issued by UNICEF on 17 June 2009, said that it had been a month since the Jowhar compound in Middle Shabelle was attached and occupied by militiamen, rendering it inaccessible to its staff members. The looting and destruction of life-saving humanitarian supplies and equipment enormously affected UNICEF’s ability to deliver services to the most vulnerable children and women[5]. 

Similarly, after Al - Shabab leaders threatened that NGOs might be attacked. As a result, Care, International Medical Corps and other NGOs working in Somalia were obliged to withdraw entirely because of such threats. This was under the suspicions that some humanitarian agencies were cooperating with the US war on terrorism by identifying insurgent locations. Kidnappings, assassinations and other attacks on NGO and UN humanitarian agency staff have increased further since August 2008 as more areas of the country are sucked into the violence.

Piracy off the Somali coast has complicated matters further. Piracy started after the collapse of the central government of Somalia but became popular some years later; the pirates developed an agenda of making an economy from Somalia’s coast. Hundreds of vessels were captured by pirates in 2008 and were released only after paying ransoms worth billions of dollars. This has encouraged pirate leaders to recruit new local youth. Since November 2007 (WFP) charters have been targeted and have required naval escorts to safely deliver cargo.  Land routes are expensive, and there is little alternative to the sea for the needed scale of emergency relief. After the Dutch navy ended their escort for WFP ships in June 2008 the organization warned it might have to stop deliveries altogether.

The TFG also puts obstacles in the way of humanitarian operations, both roadblocks and time consuming and financially draining bureaucracy. Officials often accuse NGOs for operating without respect for national sovereignty and bypassing the government. They also tend to resent the channeling of aid to IDPs whom they believe support the insurgency. At the same time, donors have put pressure on the agencies not to cooperate with insurgent factions even to gain access to the suffering population.

Somalia has never been safe for U.N. agencies and NGOs and yet aid agencies have been under enormous pressure to keep operating, both to respond to the humanitarian emergency and to reinforce a political perception that Somalia is reasonably safe, important for those seeking to shore up the TFG’s flagging legitimacy. The U.N. Political Office for Somalia is planning its own physical relocation from Nairobi to Somalia at some point in the future for this reason, but agency personnel fear that politically inspired security decisions will result in avoidable deaths and kidnappings.

 

 

(c)   Clan dynamics:

Ethnic Somalis are united by language, culture, devotion to Islam, and to a common ancestor. But, the genealogical ties have also provided the basis on which divisions among Somalis have occurred, division historically being more common than unity. As clan-families, too large and scattered for practical cooperation, in the past had no real political or economic functions, hence it is the basis of the collective Somali inclination toward internal fission and internecine conflict, as well as of the Somalis' sense of being distinct--a consciousness of otherness that borders on xenophobia.

Subsequently, with the renewal and intensification of clan feuding in the wake of Siad Barre's fall from power in early 1991, the clan-families have assumed crucial significance as pseudo-religio-political movements have pitted against one another along tribal lines in a disastrous civil war. As a result clan inter-relationships are extremely complex and often present hidden power dynamics that are difficult for external agencies to comprehend. Within the Somali context, aid is a valuable resource and, as a result, often becomes politicized and intertwined in clan disputes[6].

Furthermore, the peace process that led to the creation of the TFG was deeply divisive, with each clan staking claims to key cabinet posts. Although the 4.5 clan quota system for allocating cabinet posts was agreed, it was inevitable that some clans who failed to obtain such posts would feel aggrieved. Beneath the unity and reconciliation rhetoric, therefore, TFG infighting also reflects complex inter-clan rivalry. Therefore, mistrust and rivalry among major clans in Somalia have disfigured politics since independence and their relationship and cooperation among them has been always an uneasy détente.

(d)  Closure of Humanitarian Space:

The rise of criminal gangs operating largely outside the clan system is another fresh phenomenon. The new organized crime – piracy, people smuggling, counterfeit banknotes and kidnapping – is run by syndicates that have forged cross – clan networks. This is particularly visible in the south-central Somalia and the north-eastern autonomous region of Puntland, where sophisticated syndicates have emerged. Over the years, it has frequently been accused by aid workers of being too risky, preventing agencies from committing personnel in parts of the country. At the same time it is sometimes accused of succumbing to political pressure not to designate a region a NO GO zone. All of these are indicators of political and institutional pressure on the U.N. department of security that could compromise its ability to render accurate, dispassionate judgment on security conditions.

Secondly, the food prices have skyrocketed, eroding the IDPs and other households to feed themselves. The rise in food prices is due to global spike in the cost of grains and fuel; chronic conflict, insecurity and crime, which has badly disrupted the flow of commercial food into the country; and an epidemic of counterfeit Somali shilling by politicians and business people, creating hyper inflation and robbing poorer Somalis of their purchasing power. Mother nature is not cooperating either; a severe conflict and drought is gripping much of South-central Somalia, increasing displacement, killing of livestock and reducing harvests in farming areas.

Thirdly, humanitarian agencies in Somalia are facing daunting obstacles to deliver food aid. There is now virtually no “humanitarian space” in which aid can safely be delivered. Since 2008, the insurgent cells in Mogadishu have become an incessant threat to humanitarian actors, they are engaged in a campaign of threats and alleged assassinations against any and all Somalis working for western NGOs or collaborating with UN aid workers. However, not all insurgent members embrace this policy. For instance, the leader of Bay and Bakol regions, Mukhtar Robow, has adopted different policy from that of Al-Shabaab condemning the assassinations and attacks against the UN and aid workers and is known to be working to provide protection for aid operations in his region, but the Jihadists in Mogadishu have been targeting the national aid workers and civil society leaders. As a result, Somali aid workers and other civic leaders face a terrifying combination of threat from elements in the Jihadist, TFG, Criminal gangs, and Al-Shabaab. These attacks have put thousands of Somali professionals, aid workers, business community, and civil society leader and immediate risk.

A critical dimension of this closure of humanitarian space is the role that western foreign policies have unintentionally played in creating it. As indicated earlier the Shabaab attack against aid workers is a direct response to the US designation of Shabaab as a terrorist organization in March 2008 and the May 2008 U.S assassination of Aden Ayro. After the missile attack, the Shabaab declared its intent to widen the war to any and all western targets inside and outside the country, including Somalis working in any way with the west. Prior to these policies the Shabaab was directing its attacks against the TFG and the Ethiopian military.

Fourth, the piracy problem, which began to develop in the late 1990s, dramatically increased in 2008. The waters off the Somali coast are now ranked “the number one piracy hotspot” in the world. The reported attacks on ships in the third quarter of 2008, the pirates threaten to choke off the Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s busiest and most vital waterways. The audacity and sophistication of these pirates, as well as their ambition to extend operations well beyond Somalia’s territorial waters, have deeply alarmed the world. Major naval powers have scrambled to craft a response amid an unprecedented media outcry, particularly after a Ukrainian ship with 21 crew members and a cargo of heavy weaponry officially headed for Kenya was hijacked. An outbreak of security resolution of was issued, authorizing deployments off the coast and use of “all necessary means” to fight piracy.

(e)  Regional Variations:

Somaliland: The collapse of the central government caused chaos into the whole system and regional developments in terms of humanitarian interventions. The early efforts to consolidate peace and security that began in Somaliland in 1991 took a very different path from that of the South as significant progress was made on the economic front, customs offices were established and revenue collection restarted. A government-controlled central bank was created and the Somaliland shilling was introduced as a new currency in 1994. This developed the lives of the north-western people. Due to the skirmishes and conflicts of the southern central zone Somaliland was receiving IDPs that maintained the humanitarian crisis. Following the influx of refugees the UN provided Somaliland with humanitarian aid while it continues to assist the IDPs. In Somaliland, particularly Hargeisa, the situation for displaced persons is complicated by a lack of international recognition of Somaliland’s self-declared statehood. While the government of Somaliland considers displaced southern Somalis to be refugees on their territory, international aid agencies designate these same individuals as IDPs. This confusion over their status comes in addition to inadequate financial and material support to the displaced Somalis in Somaliland.

Puntland: Puntland plays a significant role both in the development crisis and political development of the southern and central zones. Since the TFG landed into the country, Puntland had been supporting the government having the will to build the state together, while looking after its interest of regional integration under federalism. Puntland receives thousands of IDPs from south-central Somalia and Ogaden region every month. Most of these IDPs reach Puntland as transit route on their journey to the Yemen refugee camps. According to UN reports hundreds of Somali refugees lose their lives on their journey to Yemen annually. The humanitarian situation in Puntland is similar to that of the central regions and it is caused by the pirates, regional conflict, and corruption within the government and refugee influx.

South – Central: The humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia is as a result of a lethal cocktail of factors. However, the large scale displacement caused by the fighting in Mogadishu is the most important driver. The displaced have fled mainly into the interior of the country where they lack access to food, clean water and basic health care, livelihoods and support networks. IDPs are the most vulnerable populations in any humanitarian emergency. Over 700,000 people out of the population of perhaps 6 million in south-central Somalia have been forced to flee their homes.

3.2            Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: Key Challenges

(a)  Lack of access to humanitarian assistance:

 Funding, access and security for humanitarian organizations have been and continue to be insufficient in the provision of adequate support for displaced civilians in Southern and central Somalia. Every day humanitarian aid workers face checkpoints, road blocks, extortion, car jacking, perpetual suspicion of the impartial nature of their assistance and numerous bureaucratic impediments and confusion among government authorities which obstruct humanitarian access, travel and humanitarian supplies. Risks were grave for humanitarian organizations operating in Somalia. Staff from CARE (May 2007) and Médecins Sans Frontières (December 2007) and a French journalist (December 2007) were abducted and later released, in Puntland, reportedly, by non state armed groups. Similarly, in January 2008, three Médecins Sans Frontières staff members were deliberately targeted and killed in Kismayo.

(b) Mistrust between government institutions and NGOs:

There is a profound mistrust between the TFG as well as other government institutions such as local authorities and civil society. This is not limited to internally funded COs. Grass-roots and locally formed CBOs feel this tension as well. The TFG has recently shown a tendency to try to take over civil society projects without proper procedures in place, while understandably COs are not keen to accept government’s takeover. This has already created confusion among the TFG and COs.

(c)  Lack of regulation and self-regulation:

A meaningful and reliable regulatory authority is lacking, COs in South-Central are largely unregistered and are not under the supervision of any authority and are subsequently not subject to any legal or regulatory framework and lack a national umbrella group.

(d) Loose structure and lack of clarity:

A source of the tension between the COs and the TFG is the loose structure of the COs and the insecurity felt by local authorities. There is neither a clear and concrete framework nor a structured strategy that COs set out for their activities. COs have become vulnerable to external manipulation.

(e)  Dependency on external funding:

Somali civil societies at large depend on foreign funding. This is not only results into competition amongst different groups but also means that when foreign aid is withdrawn, the groups have little or no other resources to draw on and many of them will not be able to sustain their activities.

(f)     Little international engagement and support:

The international community and international NGOs operating inside Somalia have had limited engagement with local COs. The lack of such a closer collaboration has limited the capacity of local organizations to mature or assume a larger role. Few international organizations have developed initiatives to build the capacity of local Somali NGOs. Such leadership capacity building efforts are not only important to overcome the lack of leadership capacity and organizational structure but might also help Somali COs to become more sustainable over time and reduce the dependency on external donor funding.

(g) External pressure for networking:

Donors frequently require local groups to collaborate in order to receive project funding. While this can sometimes lead to stable networks, founded on common goals, it often encourages partnership whose only reason for collaboration is to secure foreign funding.

(h) Unchanging faces:

Like all other organizations, COs run the risk of suffering from stagnant structures that frustrate the injection of new ideas and the necessary agility to adapt to the fast-changing humanitarian environment.

(i)    Closure of international borders:

Kenya government closed its border with Somalia fearing the influx of insurgent groups. Subsequently, thousands of refugee “asylum seekers” fleeing the Somalia conflict are denied their right to enter the refugee camps in Kenya.

(j)    Limited focus:

Limited focus on specific goals and or specific geographic coverage is another problem that has adversely affected humanitarian efforts in Somalia. This has also reduced the outcome of the activities of majority of the COs.

(k)    International Funding:

On the international (and funding) front, the Somalia CAP requirements have been revised downwards from US$984 to $849 million during the CAP mid-year review. The reduction is mainly in the food aid cluster amounting to $129 million. There have also been some reductions in other clusters. As of 14 July, based on the revised requirements, the Somalia CAP was 50 percent funded, having received $426 million. The best funded cluster was food with 69 percent of the requirements met, followed by nutrition and logistics at 49 percent each, coordination at 38 percent, education 11 percent, and protection 22 percent. Shelter was the only sector that was funded below 10 percent, that is, (8%). Two clusters have remained critical with their funding levels seriously affecting life-saving activities on the ground and these are Water & Sanitation at 18 percent and Health at 12 percent.

The Humanitarian Response Fund has funded 26 projects worth $5.1 million as of 7 July 2009, of which 50 percent was implemented by local Somali non-governmental organizations directly or in partnership with international organizations. The fund balance is currently $5.9 million. The bulk of the funds has been spent on WASH interventions and has received 63 percent of funding disbursed in 2009.

3.3            A Synthesis

According to the UN OCHA’s June 2009 report on the humanitarian situation in Somalia, the following conclusions can be drawn:-

1. The security situation in Mogadishu has continued to deteriorate with grave humanitarian consequences for the civilian population. Since renewed fighting started on 7 May 2009, more than 200,000 people have been displaced. Half of which were displaced during the month of June. This is the largest displacement from the city since the Ethiopian intervention in 2007.
2. The drought in central Somalia has extended to the northern part of the country and is threatening the livelihoods of more than 700,000 pastoralists and a large number of urban households whose income and food sources are linked to livestock marketing and trade. Emergency livelihood assistance is required in order to prevent a severe deterioration of the food security situation in the north.
3. On a positive note, the southern Somalia Gu’09 crop production looks promising and is expected to be near normal due to good Gu rains. Local maize and sorghum prices in most Somalia markets also continue to decrease.
4. Lack of funding is jeopardizing priority activities of the Health and Water & Sanitation clusters in South/Central Somalia. As of 7 July, the Health cluster requirements for 2009 are 12 percent funded. The WASH cluster received $6.7 million (18%) out of $36.9 million required for 2009. Compared to the same period last year, the WASH cluster has received $8 million less, and yet the needs this year are significantly higher.
5. The largest in-patient health facility (278 beds) in South/Central Somalia in Xudur town, Bakool region, closed in June due to deteriorating security. The closure is the second setback for the region; International Medical Corps was forced by Al Shabaab to suspend all their humanitarian activities in October 2008.
6. The Somalia CAP requirements have been revised downward from US$984 to $849 million during the CAP mid-year review and is 50 percent funded.

 

4.0           Conclusion

Somalia’s nineteen-year old crisis has become one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes. Since the December 2006 Ethiopian intervention, international policy has been stuck on supporting transitional federal institutions, which have become more and more irrelevant on the ground, and comply to a U.S military driven counter-terrorism policy, which has reinforced the most extremist elements of the Islamist movement. From the track record of the past several years it is clear that Ethiopian policies have not been coordinated with the Nairobi-based donor community. Indeed, the problem with Somalia is that Ethiopia is simultaneously the single most important external actor, yet its motives, interests, strategies and intentions are the most difficult to understand and predict. Even U.S diplomats, defense and intelligence officers who work closely with Ethiopian counterparts confess that Ethiopian policies toward Somalia are controversial and unpredictable.

The assassination campaign by TFG hardliners and fragments of the Al-shabaab movement is the latest attack on Somalia’s once vibrant civil society and has the potential to escalate into violent elimination of all professionals and civic figures. Somali civic figures are shocked at these killings, harassments and threats, and are either fleeing the capital or keeping a very low profile. This is an enormous setback for hopes to consolidate peace in the country as civil society leaders are essential safeguard of the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

The existing government remains the country’s best hope and merits sustained external support. At present, there is a sense of cautious optimism that the Djibouti agreement has at least produced some positive momentum, though the accord is still rejected by Islamist leadership in Somalia (Shabab & Hisbul Islam). The portion of Shabab that does not exhibit ideological cohesion and answers to a chain of command is more capable as an armed force than as a political movement in Banadir, Middle Shabelle, Hiran and other regions of south-central Somalia. Although the Shabaab has succeeded in driving tokens of TFG administrations out of towns it lacks the capacity to administer them and it has been handing over the control of the ‘liberated’ towns to local clan authorities. This has caused fear to international and local NGO working on humanitarian assistance to the IDP camps and livelihood projects.

5.     Recommendations

1. The international community should either develop a strategic plan toward humanitarian assistance of Somalia or support the TFG both in kind and capital to reach the humanitarian need of the needy people in Somalia.
2. Parties fighting in Somalia have to halt all violations of international humanitarian law.
3. The government has to serve the people and ensure protection for all displaced persons without discrimination.
4. The government of Kenya has to observe the international human rights and humanitarian laws, and allow access to its territory for the delivery of humanitarian services to Somali refugees in Kenya.
5. U.N agencies and member states should fully fund and staff emergency humanitarian assistance program to meet the needs of vulnerable Somali civilians in Somalia and throughout the region.
6. The U.N agencies and member states should increase the access to humanitarian assistance in Somalia, in terms of funding, and negotiate with the government for the access and security for humanitarian organizations.
7. The government should develop strategic planning for the humanitarian assistance to overcome hurdles of humanitarian crisis, the government also needs to sit with the both local and international non-governmental organizations to make clear its agenda for the humanitarian assistance.
8. To reduce the risks of the humanitarian assistance, the government needs to sit with the international government, and clearly spell their capacities to the Piracy problems.
9. The government should also develop criteria for the NGOs working in Somalia to speed the humanitarian assistance to the needy and vulnerable IDPs and other households.
10. The government should come up with a clearer and strong structure guiding humanitarian efforts in the country in order to overcome past obstacles and mistrust between the NGOs and TFG.
11. The Somali Diaspora should also play their role in developing the humanitarian assistance to the needy and vulnerable Somali community without discrimination.
12. The international community and international NGOs operating inside Somalia have to increase engagement with local CSOs. The lack or limitation of such a closer collaboration has limited the capacity of local organizations to mature or assume a larger role. The NGOs have to develop initiatives to build the capacity of local Somali NGOs. Areas that need to be developed include leadership, capacity-building and organizational development to become more sustainable over time and reduce dependency on external donor funding.
13. Create networks in order to receive projects funding.  Donors frequently require local groups to collaborate in order to receive project funding. While this can sometimes lead to stable networks founded on common goals it often encourages partnership whose only reason for collaboration is to secure foreign funding.
14. The humanitarian workers should increase their focus to a specific goal and well defined geographic areas where the humanitarian interventions will be benefited by the vulnerable Somalia community precisely.

6.0            Annex: Program Time Table

 

PROGRAMME

 

DATE: Thursday 20^th August, 2009

TIME:  10 am – 4:00 pm

VENUE:           Barakat  Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya

 

FORUM ON: “Humanitarian Aid in Somalia – Issues & Challenges”

 

10:00 – 10:40 am.             Arrival and registration / Teas and Snacks

10:40 – 10:45 am              Opening Remarks – Welcome (NCF)

10:45 – 10:50 am              Introduction among participants

10:50 am – 1:00 pm         Plenary Discussions (Participants)

1:00 pm – 2:00 pm                        Prayers and Lunch

2:00 pm – 2: 10 pm           Recap (Rapporteur)

2:10 pm – 3:00 pm                        Plenary Discussions (Participants)

3:00 pm – 3:45 pm                        Recommendations & Conclusions

3:45 pm – 4:00 pm                        Wrap up and Departure

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